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Preface
This research report provides greater detail on research methods and data than a
companion paper that we presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American
Agricultural Economics Association (AAEA). That paper, also authored by Thomas
Dobbs and Nicholas Streff, is titled "Potential for the Conservation Security Program to
Induce More Ecologically Diverse Crop Rotations in the Western Com Belt". The AAEA
paper contains a more extensive policy discussion of the implications of our empirical
findings. It can be accessed at:
http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-bin/detailview.pl ?paperid= 16070.
As we have explained in the present report, our assumptions about
implementation of the Conservation Security Program (CSP) were based on the original
(2002) legislation and information that was available by early 2004, before rules and
payment rates were finalized for the first CSP signup. Actual implementation rules in the
initial signup in 2004 and subsequent signups have differed from our assumptions in
some important respects. We deal briefly with some of those differences in the AAEA
paper cited above. An internship paper by Pauline Lenormand, a student from the Ecole
Nationale Superieure Agronomique de Toulouse (France), contains an examination of
CSP implementation rules for the second signup, which took place in 2005. Lenormand
compared rules and payment rates in eligible South Dakota watersheds with rules and
rates that were assumed for the analyses in our AAEA paper and the present research
report. Her unpublished internship paper-"Implementation of the USA Conservation
Security Program of the 2002 Farm Bill"-was supervised by Thomas Dobbs, and is
available from him at: Thomas.Dobbs@sdstate.edu.
The research on which this report is based was supported by the South Dakota
State University Agricultural Experiment Station, under the Economics Department
project "Agri-environmental Policy Options and Implementation Based on
Multifunctionality". We appreciate the careful review of a draft version of this report by
Dr. Gary Taylor. However, any remaining mistakes or shortcomings of the report are our
responsibility.

TLD and NJS
July 2006
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Potential Use of the Conservation Security Program to
Encourage Diverse Crop Rotations in Eastern South Dakota
by
Thomas L. Dobbs and Nicholas J. Streff

I. Introduction
A central concern in many discussions of ecological sustainability in agricultural
regions of the U.S. Midwest and Great Plains is that of crop system diversity. Many
factors have contributed to the loss of crop system diversity over that last half-century
(Dumke and Dobbs), one of which is public policy. The U.S. Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 ('2002 Farm Bill') provided for a new agri-environmental
program that could have potential to help restore some of the crop system diversity that
has been lost. The Conservation Security Program (CSP) is that program. This report,
drawn from a Master of Science in Economics thesis by one of us (Streff), contains
results of an examination of the CSP's potential to help induce more crop system
diversity in southeastern South Dakota (SD).
The Conservation Security Program (CSP)
The CSP is an agri-environmental program intended to provide financial and
technical assistance to producers who advance the conservation and improvement of soil,
water, air, energy, and plant and animal life-as well as other conservation purposes--on
Tribal and private working lands. The US Secretary of Agriculture's vision for the CSP
was spelled out as follows:

( 1) To identify and reward those farmers and ranchers meeting the very
highest standards of conservation and environmental management on their
operations;
(2) To create powerful incentives for other producers to meet those same
standards of conservation performance on their operations; and
(3) To provide benefits for generations to come (NRCS, 2004, p. 10).

The CSP established three tiers in which farmers could enroll land. A Tier 1
contract would consist of a maximum annual payment of $20,000, and a 5-year contract
that is renewable for 5 to 10 years with a possible upgrade to a higher tier level. Tier 1
would require only partial farm enrollment, and the farmer would address one significant
resource of concern for the enrolled portion of land. A Tier 2 contract would have a
maximum annual payment of $35,000 and a 5 to 10-year contract that is renewable for up
~

to 10 years. Tier 2 would require whole farm enrollment and would need to address at

!i
l

I

f
least one significant resource of concern for the entire operation. A Tier 3 contract would

f
have a maximum annual payment of $45,000 with a 5 to IO-year contract that is
renewable for up to 10 years. A Tier 3 contract would requires whole farm enrollment,
and the farmer would have to apply a resource management system that addresses all
resources of concern for the entire operation. Annual payments for each tier level are to
consist of base payments, cost share payments, and enhanced payments. The payment
rates would vary for each tier level (NRCS, 2003b).
CSP assumptions for this study
At the time the thesis on which this report draws was being completed in the
spring of 2004, only the proposed CSP "rule," from the Federal Register, was available

2

II

for study. The proposed "rule" was published on January 2, 2004, and had a 60-day
comment period that ended March 2, 2004. This proposed "rule" was a general outline of
the CSP program.

It identified five options for implementation of the CSP.

The

alternatives ranged from changing the rates for base and cost share payments to limiting
the CSP enrollment to specific geographic regions in order to stay within budgetary
constraints set for the CSP. For our analysis, the original framework for the CSP as
designated in the 2002 Farm Bill and information from the proposed "rule" were used to
develop the majority of the assumptions for the CSP.

Study pumose
The overall purpose of this study was to analyze the incentives in the
Conservation Security Program for developing longer, more ecologically sustainable crop
rotations for farming systems in the Western Com Belt. Specific research objectives were
to:
1) Develop a "representative" farm model for southeastern South Dakota,

including ''typical" and alternative, longer crop rotations.
2) Analyze the economic incentives for the operator of a "representative"
southeastern South Dakota farm to use the CSP for longer crop rotations.

3

II. The Study Region in Eastern South Dakota
The study area lies in southeastern South Dakota, covering much of the Big Sioux
Aquifer (Figure 1). This area constitutes a major portion of the Big Sioux River drainage
area in South Dakota. The aquifer underlying the Big Sioux River provides drinking
water for a large portion of the state's population. Therefore, agricultural practices that
potentially affect the river and underlying aquifer are of great interest to both farmers and
the general public (Dobbs and Carr). This area is on the edge of the Western Corn Belt,
with corn and soybeans being the dominant crops (Dumke and Dobbs).
Major crops

The six counties that were included in the study area are Moody, Minnehaha,
Lincoln, Turner, Union, and Clay. Major crops grown in the six-county area during the
last 5 years are shown in Figure 2. The major crops are corn and soybeans, and there also
is a small but significant proportion of cropped land planted to alfalfa. The numbers
represent the 5-year average (1997-2001) of the acres harvested for these crops. This is
the average based on the total acres covered by these specific crops and does not include
all cropland in the study area or pastureland. An earlier study by Dobbs and Carr detailed
the profiles of Moody and Minnehaha Counties, which are the two northern counties in
our study area. Dobbs and Carr showed that corn had been a major crop in these two
counties since at least the 1950s. Soybeans did not become a major crop until the 1980s.
Small grain acreage diminished significantly over the same time period.
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Figure 2. Six-County Study Region Profile:
1997-2001 Average Acres Harvested

Oats Acras Harveliled
0.6%
Alfalfa Acres Harvested

6.3%
All Wheal Acres Harvested
0.4%

Soybean Acras Harvested
48.5%
Com Acres Harvested

44.3%

Source: SDASS 1998-2002
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Soybeans had the largest proportion of harvested acres in the study area in 19972001, with a 5-year average of nearly 49 percent (Figure 2). Com was the second most
common crop, accounting for 44 percent of the total acres harvested. Alfalfa had the
third largest 5-year average, at 6 percent. For small grains, oats had a 5-year average of
less than 1 percent. Wheat did not account for a significant number of harvested acres,
but nonetheless was included in the analysis. Wheat acres expanded some in Moody
County during the 1970s when wheat prices rose significantly (Dumke and Dobbs), and
wheat continues to have good agronomic potential for crop rotations in southeastern SD
that include small grains.
Farm sizes

The average farm size for the study area was determined using 1997 Census of
Agriculture data for South Dakota (data from the 2002 Census had not yet been released
when the profile was constructed). The average farm size for each county is presented in
Table 1. Using the total acres of land in farms and the total number of farms for the sixcounty area, an average farm size of 438 acres was established. However, farms with 260
to 499 acres represent only 20 percent of the farms and 17 percent of the land within the
study area. To capture a larger portion of land within the study area, the "representative"
farm size range was assumed to be 500-1,999 acres.

Based on 1997 Census of

Agriculture data, this range captures almost 30 percent of the number of farms and over
60 percent of the land within the study area.
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Table 1. Study Region Farm Size Analysis, by County

Number of Farms
Land in Farms
Farm Size

Minnehaha Moody

Clay

Lincoln Turner

Union

Total

1125
406280
361

549
283783
517

397
225902
569

806
318707
395

832
352353
424

494
254028
514

4203
1841053
438

119
43119

81
30495

161
60507

188
68983

92
33517

845
314176

21.68%

20.40%

19.98%

22.60%

18.62% 20.10%

15.19%

13.50%

18.99%

19.58%

13.19%

17.07%

114
80332

105
76186

155
105200

194
133378

107
74593

850
590686

20.77%

26.45%

19.23%

23.32%

21.66%

20.22%

28.31%

33.73%

33.01%

37.85%

29.36% 32.08%

83
107976

72
98604

54
72339

66
82778

64
86734

68
89587

7.38%

13.11%

13.60%

8.19%

7.69%

13.77% 9.68%

26.58%

34.75%

32.02%

25.97%

24.62%

35.27% 29.22%

10
36049

12
29590

9
25872

7
23140

14
34877

71
198056

1.82%

3.02%

1.12%

0.84%

2.83%

1.69%

12.70%

13.10%

8.12%

6.57%

13.73%

10.76%

Farm Size Analysis
Farms w/ 260-499
Acres
204
Total Acres
77555
Percent of Total
Farms
18.13%
Percent of Total
Acres
19.09%
Farms w/ 500-999
Acres
175
120997
Total Acres
Percent of Total
Farms
15.56%
Percent of Total
Acres
29.78%
Farms w/ 1000-1999
Acres
Total Acres
Percent of Total
Farms
Percent of Total
Acres

w/
2000+
Farm
Acres
19
Total Acres
48528
Percent of Total
Farms
1.69%
Percent of Total
Acres
11.94%

Grouping
Sizes*

407
538018

Farm

Farms w/ 500-1999
Acres
258
186
159
221
258
175
1257
Total Acres
228973
178936 148525 187978 220112 164180 1128704
Percent of Total
Farms
22.93%
33.88% 40.05% 27.42% 31.01% 35.43% 29.91%
Percent of Total
Acres
56.36%
63.05% 65.75% 58.98% 62.47% 64.63% 61.31%
• Farms with 259 acres of land or less are not shown here, but the percentage calculations are based on all
farms, including those in the smallest category.
Source: NASS 1997 Census of Agriculture

8

Based on the above information, the average farm size of 438 acres does not
sufficiently represent the farms within the study area. The Census data suggest that a
farm between 500 and 1,999 acres provides a more complete representation of the study
area. A 1,000-acre farm was determined to best represent the study area.
The 1997 Census of Agriculture data also suggested that the typical farm in the
study area did not have a livestock enterprise. The data indicated that 34 percent of the
4,203 farms in the study area had beef cattle and only 14 percent of the farms had swine
included as part of the operation.
Using 1997 Census of Agriculture and National Agricultural Statistics Service
data, a "representative" farm for the study area was determined to have 1,000 cropland
acres and no livestock enterprises. Based on cropland acres planted and harvested data of
the major crops in the study area (Figure 2), soybeans and com are the two major crops
for the area, covering 93 percent of the cropland harvested based on the 1997-2001
average of the major crops. Alfalfa was a distant third, accounting for 6 percent of the
land under major crops within the six-county region, and oats and wheat acreage each
made up less than 1 percent.

9

III. Methods for Representative Farm Analysis
The "representative" farm for the study region was developed using the study
region profile presented in section II, previous SDSU research, SDSU Extension
Economist expertise, County Extension Educator interviews, and interviews with
farmers. Although the size of the farm has now been specified, other features of the
''representative" farm-such as crop rotation and tillage practices-also had to be
specified. The following information covers the steps taken to develop the
"representative" farm and the associated enterprise budgets.

The 'representative farm'
The "representative" rotation for the study region was determined to be a com and
soybean rotation. The need for small grains and forage has declined, since most of the
farmers within the study area do not have livestock enterprises. In addition, commodity
prices and Federal farm program payments for cash crops such as soybeans and com have
been appealing to many producers.
"Conventional tillage," used by the majority of farmers in the study region, was
determined to be a tillage system consisting of chiseling com stalks and small grain
stubble after fall harvest and either field cultivating or disking soybean and wheat residue
in the spring as needed to incorporate fertilizer and herbicides during seedbed
preparation. Conventional tillage, as defined for this study, does not include a moldboard
plow. Interviews suggested that no-till farming systems are also frequently used,
especially when planting soybeans.

In the case of the com-soybean rotation, drilled

soybeans, which include soybeans planted in less than 30-inch rows with a no-till drill or
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air seeder, were just as common as conventionally planted soybeans in 30-inch rows in
some parts of the study area.

We decided to include both a conventionally rowed

soybean system and a system in which soybeans are no-till drilled in 15-inch rows.
The tillage system of a farm can play a large role in the bottom-line for the
operation, but with the increased use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in seed
varieties, the seed type can also play a role in the profitability of the operation. The
primary types of seeds planted in the study region are varieties of GMO com and GMO
soybeans. Results of interviews indicated that Bt com, which includes a gene that makes
the plant produce a substance that kills the European com borer, was the most common
type of com planted. Roundup Ready (RR) soybeans, which have an added gene that
inhibits the effects of the quickly-degrading Roundup herbicide, was the most commonly
planted soybean seed variety in the study region.

Use of 'Cost and Returns Estimator' (CARE) program
The assumptions for yields, prices, machinery use, and land charges were entered
into the Cost and Returns Estimator (CARE) program to calculate each crop's enterprise
budget. CARE was developed by the USDA's Natural Resource Conservation Service,
and is designed to evaluate the costs and returns for growing a specific crop or crop
rotation. Other cost assumptions such as interest costs, insurance costs, pesticide costs
and application amounts, fuel costs, and management costs were obtained from budgets
developed by Peterson. When budgets needed to be altered with respect to fertilizer,
recommendations were obtained from Gerwing and Gelderman.
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Repair costs for machinery were based on long-run average repair costs; that is,
the estimated total repair cost over the life of a machine was divided by its total hours of
use. This number was used to calculate the repair cost per acre. As a result, these
budgets likely overstate repair costs for newer machines and understate repair costs for
older machines. The algorithms used for calculating machine costs were developed by
the American Society of Agricultural Engineers, and the prices used for those algorithms
were obtained from Lazarus and Selley.
An enterprise budget was developed for each crop. In some cases, a specific crop

had multiple budgets, differing with each rotation. Input costs such as fertilizer expense
sometimes vary for a single crop with multiple budgets, depending in part on the fertilizer
credits from previous crops in the rotation. Yield and price assumptions for each crop did
not vary with rotation, except for the organic system prices and yields, which were
adjusted based on results of previous studies.
Alternative and organic crop rotations

After formulating the "representative" farm for the study region and a baseline
rotation, alternative and organic crop rotations were formulated for CSP analyses and
comparisons with baseline systems.

The alternative and organic rotations include

rotations of various lengths and crop mixes. Information from County Educator and
farmer interviews, together with data from SDSU' s Southeast South Dakota Experiment
Farm, were used to specify alternative rotations. The alternative and organic rotations
were compared to the baseline com-soybean rotation, to measure profitability and the
potential effects of CSP payments.

12

Winter wheat was added to the com-soybean rotation to make it a 3-year rotation.
A similar 3-year rotation was developed using spring wheat. Although winter and spring
wheat are not major crops in the study region-nor have they been over most of the last
50 years (Dobbs and Carr}-the comments from interviewees suggested that if small
grains were added to the com and soybean rotation, wheat would be the first choice.
There was no clear preference between spring and winter wheat. The com-soybeansspring wheat rotation models a rotation that is being studied at the Southeast Experiment
Farm.
Alfalfa was included in several rotations. Alfalfa represents the third largest crop
acreage harvested in the study area. Research has shown that alfalfa sometimes enhances
the profitability of farming systems (Henning and Dobbs, Mends and Dobbs). Alfalfa
also is included in current rotation studies at the Southeast Experiment Farm. Alfalfa was
both straight-seeded and planted with a nurse crop in the enterprise budgets, because
interview data and past research did not provide a clear consensus about how alfalfa is
typically planted in the study area. Oats and spring wheat were used as nurse crops for
alfalfa in the rotations we analyzed.
Oats represent the largest acreage harvested for any small grain in the study
region. Oats account for less than 1 percent of the harvested acres in the study area (of
the six major crops considered). County Educators and farmers indicated that oats are
primarily used as a nurse crop for alfalfa.
Organic rotations also were developed for analysis. The organic rotations were
developed in part from recent studies in Minnesota and Iowa. In the Minnesota study,
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Porter et al. compared 2 and 4-year crop rotations. The rotations included a 4-year comsoybean-oatlalfalfa-alfalfa organic rotation. The Iowa study included a similar 4-year
rotation (Delate et al.). Both studies concluded that organic rotations are competitive
with conventional corn-soybean rotations under normal growing conditions. Porter et al.
concluded that while there was a reduction in both corn and soybean yields in the 4-year
organic rotation compared to a conventional 2-year com-soybean rotation, the organic
rotation had lower production costs than the conventional rotation; consequently, net
returns for the two rotations, without taking into account organic price premiums, were
roughly equivalent. The results of Porter et al. and Delate et al. are consistent with those
of several other studies conducted at land-grant universities in the Midwest, and suggest
that organic production systems can be competitive with conventional production systems
under at least some conditions.
The baseline, alternative, and organic rotations that were analyzed are listed in
Table 2. The rotations ranged in length from the 2-year corn-soybean rotation used as the
baseline to an 8-year oats/alfalfa-alfalfa-alfalfa-alfalfa-corn-soybeans-corn-soybeans
rotation. Some rotations included both GMO and non-GMO seed varieties. Only one
rotation, baseline 2, had no-till soybeans; otherwise, all rotations with soybeans were
assumed to be planted with a min-till planter in 30-inch rows. The organic rotations
follow National Organic Program guidelines and practices commonly accepted for
organic certification-the use of manure for fertilization, no synthetic chemical pesticides
or insecticides, and use of certified organic seed (non-GMO).
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Table 2. Baseline, Alternative, and Organic Rotations Evaluated
Baseline Rotations*
Baseline 1
Com-Soybeans
--Soybeans planted in 30-inch rows

Baseline 2

Com-Soybeans
--Soybeans planted w/ no-till drill in 15-inch rows.

Alternative Rotations*
A.

Com-Soybeans-Spring Wheat

B.

Com-Soybeans-Winter Wheat

C.

Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Com-Soybeans-Com-Soybeans

D.

Oats/Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Com-Soybeans-Com-Soybeans
--This rotation is evaluated with both GMO and conventional
seed varieties.

E.

Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Com-Soybeans-Winter Wheat
--This rotation is evaluated with both GMO and conventional
seed varieties.

F.

Spring Wheat/Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Com-Soybeans
--This rotation is evaluated with both GMO and conventional
seed varieties.

G.

Oats/Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Com-Soybeans-Com

Organic Rotations**

A.

Com-Soybeans-Oats/Alfalfa-Alfalfa

B.

Com-Soybeans-Oats/Alfalfa-Alfalfa-Alfalfa

*Baseline and alternative rotations use GMO seed varieties unless otherwise noted.
**Organic rotations use certified organic seed varieties.
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Major budgeting assumptions

Budgeting assumptions about machinery costs, crop prices, yields, and land
charge were as follows.
Machinery costs. It was assumed, regardless of rotation, that the same size and
type of implement would be used for any given tillage practice. We also assumed that an

implement would be used for the same number of acres or hours per year, regardless of
rotation. This was done to isolate differences in enterprise costs due to differences in
tillage practices, rather than to differences in efficiency of machinery use. In other words,
costs per acre of any given machinery operation (such as disking com stubble) were
assumed to be the same wherever the operation was applicable, regardless of the crop
rotation. Machine costs for fall tillage operations were included in costs for crops planted
and harvested in that same calendar year. Lazarus and Selley provided the information
for machinery replacement costs and labor charges used in the enterprise budgets.
Prices. The crop price assumptions were based on data from May and Diersen
(2003). The prices used in the enterprise budgets were the South Dakota 5-year (19972001) average prices for each commodity, since 2001 was the most recent year with
complete price data available at the time calculations were made. The prices used in the
enterprise budgets are shown in Table 3.
In the case of the organic rotations, an organic premium is included in some of the
selling prices for organically produced crops. Streff and Dobbs reported price
comparisons for organically grown crops and conventionally grown crops. An organic
farm price-to-South Dakota cash price ratio was established for com, soybeans, and oats
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from 1998 through 2002.

The organic prices used for the enterprise budgets were

calculated by talcing the 5-year average organic farm and South Dakota cash price ratios
and applying the ratios to the conventional prices used in the enterprise budgets. The
organic premiums were discounted to account for the 3-year transition period required for
a farmer to become certified organic, at which time they are eligible for the organic
premium. Based on a 10-year time frame, a farmer transitioning from conventional to
organic practices would be eligible for the organic premium 8 of 10 years, or 80 percent
of the time. Therefore, the prices used for organic crops reflected the assumption that
conventional prices would be received 20 percent of the time. Organic prices shown in
Table 3 reflect that transition period adjustment. Table 4 shows the organic farm-toSouth Dakota cash price ratios.
Yields. A 5-year average per acre yield was calculated for each crop in the study
region. This 5-year average was used as the per acre yield in each crop's enterprise
budget. With the exception of organic systems, the yield for each crop was assumed to
be the same for each rotation, which means corn in the baseline rotation yields the same
as corn in an 8-year rotation. Also, it was assumed that yields are the same in different
tillage systems. The yields for each crop are presented in Table 3.
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Table 3. Crop Yield and Price Assumptions
Cro

Yield bu/ac
124
37
44
32
46

Price
$/bu
$1.75
$4.77
$3.03
$3.03
$2.59
$1.30
$3.30
$12.47
$2.07
Price $/ton.

Tons/ac.
1.50
4.50
4.00
Or anic Alfalfa Yr. 1·- no-cuttin
Or anic Alfalfa Yr. 2-3 4.05
*Spring wheat seeded with alfalfa only spring wheat is harvested
**Alfalfa straight seeded or with oats has the same yield Alfalfa Yr.1
***Organic alfalfa is seeded with oats only the oats are harvested in Org. Alfalfa Yr.1

Alfalfa Yr. 1**
Alfalfa Yr. 2-3

Table 4. Organic Farm-to-South Dakota Cash Price Ratios 1998-2002
Crop
Ratio
Corn
2.106
Sovbeans
3.016
1.740
Oats
Source: Streff and Dobbs
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Porter et al. indicated that organically grown com yields were, on average, 92
percent of the conventionally grown com yields in their study. Also, their organically
grown soybean yields were approximately 83 percent of conventional yields. Porter et al.
also found that organic alfalfa yield was 92 percent of the conventional yield, but organic
oats yields were similar to conventional yields. The average organic com yield reported
in Delate et al. was 96 percent of the conventional yield, and the average organic soybean
yield was higher than the conventional yield. To present a conservative approach to the
organic rotations, we utilized ratios similar to those of Porter et al.-90 percent for corn
and alfalfa and 84 percent for soybeans. The yields for each organic crop are presented
in Table 3.
Land charge. The land charge used for the enterprise budgets was the 2003
average cropland cash rental rate for the six-county area as reported by SDASS (2003),
approximately $90 per acre. Our analysis compares each crop rotation's profitability on
the same "representative" farm, assuming land charges and other land ownerships costs
are not affected by the rotation selected.
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IV. Policy Assumptions for Analyses
Prior to conducting the analyses, policy asswnptions had to be established. These
asswnptions are described next, first for so-called 'commodity program' provisions and
then for the CSP.
Commodity program assumptions

Since this study focused on the potential incentives for a "representative" farmer
to switch from a baseline rotation to an alternative or organic rotation, Federal farm
program payments asswnptions-which include direct payments (DPs), counter-cyclical
payments (CCPs), and loan deficiency payments (LDPs}-had to be the same for all
rotations developed and analyzed. The 2002 Farm Bill left producers with several options
to update base acres and payment yields used for certain commodity program payments.
For this analysis, the producer was asswned to update his or her base acres and payment
yields with the baseline rotation of com or soybeans in mind.
Direct payments.

Direct payments are decoupled from current prices and

production and are determined by the base acres and base yields. DP rates are per bushel
payments that were to remain fixed over the life of the 2002 Farm Bill. We asswned that
the base acres were updated to reflect the average acres planted, plus those prevented
from planting due to weather conditions, during crop years 1998-2001. In the case of the
"representative" farm with a com-soybean rotation, a base of 500 acres of com and 500
acres of soybeans was asswned.

I

The payment yield for the "representative" farm for com was obtained from Farm
Service Agency (FSA) data for the study region. The com payment yield was determined

I

I
~
I

i
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to be 85 bushels/acre. The soybean payment yield was derived as outlined in the FSA
Direct Payment guidelines. That yield (29 bushels/acre) was calculated as the 1998-2001
average yield for the study region, backed up to equivalent 1981-1985 yields, or
approximately 78 percent of the current yield.
Counter-cyclical payments. Counter-cyclical payments are available for covered
commodities whenever the effective price is less than the target price. Target prices were
fixed for 2002-2003, and rose for most commodities for 2004-2007. The payment amount
is equal to the product of the payment rate, the payment acres (85 percent of base acres),
and the payment yield. The payment rate for a commodity is the target price minus [(the
higher of the average national loan rate or the average national yearly price) plus the
direct payment]. CCPs are intended to support and stabilize farm income when
commodity prices are less than target prices.
According to the FSA data, most South Dakota farmers updated their based acres
according to the 1998-2001 average acreage planted. Most South Dakota producers also
chose to update their counter-cyclical payment yields to 93.5 percent of the farm's 19982001 average yields. The base acres for com and soybeans remained the same, at 500
acres each, but the base yields were updated to 93.5 percent of the 1998-2001 average
com and soybean yields for the study region.

Assuming the operator of our

representative farm did the same, the payment acreage base was 500 acres each of com
and soybeans, and payments were based on 85 percent of those acreages. CCP yields
were 121 bushels for com and 35 bushels for soybeans.
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Loan deficiency payments. LDPs are coupled to current production and prices.
Producers can take LDPs any day after harvesting their crop and before losing beneficial
interest in the commodity. The LDP is equal to the loan rate minus that day's posted
county price (PCP).

In the case of our "representative" farm, the PCP for each

commodity was assumed to be the same as the 5-year average (non-organic) price used in
the enterprise budgets (Table 3). The loan rates used to determine the LDPs were the
average 2002 loan rates for the six-county area that we obtained from FSA data. We
assumed that the operator of the representative farm received an LDP for a commodity if
the loan rate was greater than the PCP.
Conservation Security Program assumptions
Payments for the CSP consist of three types. First, there is a base payment. The
base payment was supposed to be based on the average national per acre rental rate for a
specified use during 2001 or an appropriately adjusted rate to ensure regional equity
(NRCS, 2004).
The second portion of a CSP payment was to be derived from the average county
cost of adopting or maintaining the practice for the 2001 crop year. Average county costs
were to be determined by the US Secretary of Agriculture. A cost share payment could
cover up to 75 percent (up to 90 percent for beginning farmers) of the cost of maintaining
or implementing a practice (NRCS, 2004).
The third portion of a CSP payment is an "enhanced payment." Enhanced
payments were to be determined by the Secretary and involve payments for producers
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who exceed contract expectations, such as by participating m on-farm conservation
research (Duffy; NRCS, 2004).
CSP framework. In establishing our CSP assumptions, we used tier definitions
and base payment levels as specified in the original legislative language. We applied the
CSP to each alternative and organic rotation, but not to the baseline rotations. The CSP
payment rates varied for each rotation because the rotations were assumed to be enrolled
in different tiers.
Base payments were to be derived from the 2001 average national per-acre rental
rate or a related regional or local rate to prevent geographical bias. According to
legislation, the base payment for Tier 1 was to be 5 percent of the rental rate, but the
payments could not exceed $5,000. The base payment for Tier 2 was to be 10 percent of
the rental rate, not to exceed $10,500. The base payment for Tier 3 was to be 15 percent
of the rental rate, not to exceed $13,500 (NRCS, 2003b).
For our analyses, the 2001 average cropland cash rental rate for the six-county
area (as published by the SDASS) was used. This was $84 per acre. The legislative
language specified that 2001 data would be used for the life of the program regardless of
the actual year (NRCS, 2003b).
Each rotation (other than the baseline rotations) was enrolled in Tier 1, 2, or 3,
based on definitions set forth in the CSP legislation and assumptions that we made about
the potential environmental gains each rotation might provide. A Tier 1 contract would
receive a base payment per acre enrolled equal to 5 percent of the $84 rental rate, or
$4.20 per acre. A Tier 2 contract base payment would be equal to 10 percent of the $84
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rental rate, or $8.40 per acre. A Tier 3 contract would receive a base payment equal to 15
percent of the $84 rental rate, or $12.60 per acre.
The base payments rates were subject to change by the time CSP rules were
finalized.

Our assumed payment rates were based on the original CSP legislation.

Alternatives that were under consideration implied substantially lower base payments
(NRCS, 2003a). In fact, rules used in initial CSP signups have not allowed base (now
called "stewardship") payment rates as high as allowed in the legislation and assumed in
our analyses.
According to the CSP legislation, both costs of new practices and costs of
maintaining existing practices can be eligible for cost share payments (NRCS, 2003b).
Although the cost share payments were under review by policymakers when our analyses
were conducted, and the payments could be reduced to only 5 percent cost share, we
assumed 75 percent cost share as allowed in the original legislative language. The cost
share payments were applied only to rotations that contain alfalfa, since the establishment
costs for alfalfa tend to be relatively high. The cost share payments for alfalfa included
only the establishment costs.

Establishment costs include spring tillage operations,

fertilizer, seed, and planting. We assumed that a farmer participating in the CSP would
receive a payment equal to 75 percent of the alfalfa establishment costs.
Enhanced payments, according to the CSP legislation, may be provided if the
CSP's activities will increase conservation performance as a result of additional effort
made by the producer that: improves a resource of concern to a condition that exceeds the
minimum eligibility requirements for the participant's tier of participation or for other
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actions; addresses local conservation priorities in addition to the concerns for the
agricultural operation; or involves the producer in research and demonstration projects,
cooperation with other producers to implement watershed or regional conservation plans
covering at least 75 percent of the targeted area, or assessment and evaluation activities
relating to practices included in a conservation security plan. Rates for the enhanced
payments had not been determined at the time our analyses were conducted. Therefore,
we did not include them. Although farmers adopting some of our alternative and organic
systems might be eligible for enhanced payments, without clear guidelines for estimating
payment rates at the time of our analyses, a defensible method for specifying payment
rates could not be established.
Resources of concern. A CSP contract must address resource concerns faced by a
farm operation. Resource concerns may include, but are not limited to: soil erosion,
water quality/quantity, air quality (wind erosion), animal grazing productivity, or wildlife
(NRCS, 2003a). The main resource concerns outlined in the proposed "rule" were water
quality/quantity and soil erosion. To achieve the goal of maintaining the resource of
concern at a non-degradation standard, which means maintaining the resource at a level
adequate to protect and prevent degradation, the producer may employ any number of
conservation practices outlined and approved by the NRCS.

The proposed "rule"

asserted that the CSP might be limited to sensitive aquifer areas (such as the Big Sioux
Aquifer). However, in our analyses, we assumed that the CSP would not be limited to
particular geographic areas or specifically to soil and water concerns.
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In our study, we were concerned with the conservation practice of a resourceconserving crop rotation. We assumed that alternative and organic rotations would fall
within the guidelines for a resource-conserving crop rotation. A resource-conserving crop
rotation or conservation crop rotation is defined as a crop rotation that includes at least
one resource-conserving crop, reduces erosion, improves soil fertility and tilth, interrupts
pest cycles, and reduces depletion of soil moisture (Harkin et al.). By definition, this
means growing various crops in a planned sequence.

This sequence may involve

growing high residue producing crops such as corn or wheat in rotation with low residue
producing crops such as vegetables or soybeans, as stated in the NRCS Field Office
Technical Guide (FOTG).
Alternative rotations A and B may not qualify as resource-conservmg crop
rotations, since they may not have a large or diverse enough crop mix to provide
sufficient environmental benefits. However, we assumed that rotations A and B each
would be eligible for a Tier 1 CSP contract. Alternative rotations C through G and the
organic rotations that we considered, in our view, clearly should be considered resourceconserving rotations. Alternative rotations C through G were assumed to be enrolled in
Tier 2 CSP contracts. Organic rotations were assumed to address all resources of concern
for the operation, resulting in Tier 3 CSP contracts.
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V. Results
Results of the rotation analyses are shown for various income definitions, from
'net income without Government payments' to 'net income with all Government
payments'. Impacts on net income of adding CSP payments are shown explicitly.
The same farm program assumptions were applied to each rotation analyzed. The
rotations all were applied to the same 1,000-acre "representative" farm that was described
in Section III. In the following presentation, results are presented on a 'per acre' basis,
derived from the 1,000-acre representative farm.
A spreadsheet model was developed to allow all rotations to be compared on a
systematic basis. Analyses started with the enterprise budgets for each individual crop.
Each budget was generated from the CARE program and applied to the same 1,000-acre
"representative" farm. The crops in each rotation were divided equally on the cropland
of this farm. In the case of the baseline rotation, only com and soybeans were produced,
which means there were 500 acres of com and 500 acres of soybeans planted. The longer
rotations have less com and soybeans. For example, rotation D, which is an 8-year crop
rotation, has only 250 acres each of com and soybeans and 125 acres for each stage of
alfalfa development. The spreadsheet produced an average per acre net return for that
specific rotation.
The terms used to analyze profitability of rotations must now be explained. Net
income without Government payments (NI w/o Govt payments) refers to the net return
generated only from the sale of the crops in the rotation. Net income with program
payments (NI w/ prog payments) includes income generated from the sale of the crops
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plus any payments received from DPs, CCPs, or LDPs. Net income with all Government
payments (NI w/ all Govt payments) includes all of the above plus any payments received
from the CSP.
Farm program payments in the rotation are shown on a per acre basis. The direct
and counter-cyclical payments were calculated based on the assumptions presented in
Section IV. The DP was $15.54 per acre and the CCP was $18.98 per acre for each
rotation, when baseline crop prices were used. The payments remained the same for each
rotation, since the same 'base acres and yields' were assumed for each rotation. In other
words, even if a farmer operating the "representative" farm changes rotations, the DP and
CCP calculations for that farm do not change.
The LDPs for each rotation also are shown on a per acre basis.

The LDPs

resulted from the eligible crops assumed to be grown in each rotation. As previously
stated, prices used for analyses were the 5-year average prices for each crop. With these
prices, com, soybeans, oats, and winter wheat were eligible for LDPs. Winter wheat had
the highest per bushel LDP of $.26, or $11.96 per acre.

Com produced in the non-

organic rotations had a $.05 per bushel LDP, or $6.20 per acre, and non-organic-soybeans
received an LDP of $.06 per bushel, or $2.22 per acre. The LDP for oats was $.05 per
bushel, or $3.35 per acre. Spring wheat was the only crop not eligible for an LDP when
baseline crop prices were assumed, since the PCP was greater than the loan rate.
LDPs for organically produced crops are generally less than the conventionally
produced crops on a per acre basis. Organically produced crops are eligible for LDPs
even if the farmer receives a premium for the crop. Organically produced crops received
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the same per bushel payment, but since the yields for some organically produced crops
were assumed to be less than the non-organic yields, the LDPs per acre were less.
LDPs for each crop are shown in the Table 5. The PCP is the 5-year average
price that was used in the enterprise budgets. The loan rate represents the average 2002
loan rate for the study region.

Table 5. Loan Deficiency Payment Calculations
Crop

PCP

LDP

Yield

LDP

$/bu
$1.75

Loan
Rate
$/bu
$1.80

$/bu
$.05

bu/ac
124

$/ac
$6.20

Com

Soybeans $4.77

$4.83

$.06

37

$2.22

Winter
Wheat
Oats

$2.59

$2.85

$.26

46

$11.96

$1.30

$1.35

$.05

67

$3.35

OrgCom $1.75

$1.80

$.05

112

$5.60

$4.77
Org
Soybeans
Org Oats $1.30

$4.83

$.06

31

$1.86

$1.35

$.05

67

$3.35
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Baseline analysis

Baseline rotations 1 and 2 were the rotations developed from the study region
profile and County Educator and farmer interviews. These rotations represent the
rotations that are mostly likely to be grown within the study region and serve as the basis
for comparison to other rotations. They provide a basis for the estimated returns for a
"representative" farm in the study region.
Table 6 contains a summary of the economic results for all of the crop systems
analyzed, including the baseline 1 and 2 reference rotations. Results are shown for net
income without Government payments and net income with commodity-related program
payments. 'Commodity payments' are also broken down into DPs, CCPs, and LDPs for
each rotation. All results are shown in terms of a per-acre average for each rotation
system. The portion of the table relating to CSP payments will be discussed later in this
report.
Baseline rotation 1 has one of the lowest net income without Government
payment values.

The average per acre return for the rotation is -$41.63. With the

addition of the DP, CCP, and LDP, the net income with program payments return is
-$2.90 per acre (Table 6). Inclusion of the DPs, CCPs, and LDPs, which total $38.73 per
acre, causes the rotation to nearly break even (when the land charge of $90 per acre is
included).
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Table 6. Rotation Net Returns with Baseline Prices and Yields
CSP

Nlw/o
Govt

Rotation
Basel.ine
1
Basenne
2
A
B

c

0-.GMO
D-Conv

E--Gmo
w

.....

E-Conv
F-Gmo

F-Cenv
G

Pavme~

Crops

LOP

Total
Total
Nlw/
CSP
Cost
NlwJall
Prag
Prag
CSP
Base
Share
Govt
Pavments Pavments Pavment Pavment PavrnGl'll Pavments

CCP

DP

$18.98

$15.54

$38.73

-$2.90

--

$0.QO

-$2.90

-$5.35
-$6,33
-$7.04
$32.34
$39.53

-$4,20
$4.20
$8.40
$8.40

$0.00
$4.20
$4.20
$14.25
$14.34
$14..34
$16.20
$18.20
$15.58
$15.58
$16.31

-$5.35
-$2.13
-$2.84
$46.59
$53.86
$42:50
$44.38
$60•.91
$62,79
$51.53

cs

-$41.63 $4.21

o,s

-$44.08 $4,21

$15.54

...l43.es
-$413.36

$18.98
$18.98
)9 $18.98
$2.11 $18.98
$~$1E$.98
$2.5
$18.98
$3.40. $18..{18
$3.40 $18.98
$1.40 $18;98
$1,,40 $18.98
$1.96 $18.98

$15.54
$15.54
$15.54
$15.54
$15.54
$15.54
$15.54
$15.54
$15.54
$15.54

$38.73
$37.33
$41.32
$36.63
$37.05
$37.05
$37.92
$37.
$35.93
$35.93
$36.48

$2.70

$15.54

1101

Cs SW

csww
a,aa a,cs,c.s
o/a,a·.a a. o,s c s
o/a,a,a,a c s,c,s
a;aac s,ww
a.a.S.C.S:.WW
sw/aa.~.a.c.s

sw/a,a,aia,c,s

o/a,aa.csc

$26.3
$28.18
14!U3

.40
$8.40

$47.20
$35.. 22

$8.40
$8.40

$5.85
$5.94
$6.94
$7.80
$7.80
$7.18
$7.18
$7.91

$37.23

$12.78

$12.60

$8.54

$21.14

$33.92

$2.70 $18.98 $15.54

$37.23

$99.25 I

$12.60

$8.54

$21.14

$120,3$

-$3.20 $2.16 $18.98

$1.5•.54

$36.68

$33.48

$12.60

$6.83

$19.43

$52.91

$65.97 $2.16 $18.98

$15.54

$36.68

$102.65

$12.60

$6.83

$19.43

$122.09

-$4.29
$2.48
$5.30
-$11.62.

•

-$9.,74
$1:1:.-40
$1:1 ..28
-$1.27

$42~~
$BAO

$~.68

OrgANo

Premium
Ot,gA-

c.s,o/aa

-$24.4,5

c,soia.a

$62.02

$18.98

()r9

Premium
OrgB-

No

Premium . cs,o/a a a
OrgB-Org

Premium

c,s,ola,a,a

Baseline rotation 2, which has no-till soybeans, shows an even lower net income
without Government payments (-$44.08 per acre). The rotation had -$5.35 per acre in net
income with all Government payments (Table 6).
commodity program payments as baseline 1.

Baseline 2 receives the same

The baseline 2 net income-however

measured-is $2.45 per acre less than the baseline 1 net income. The difference can be
attributed mostly to the higher seed cost for soybeans in a no-till system. If yields actually
are higher, on average, for no-till soybeans than for soybeans rowed with a min-till
planter, then the net income comparison would be different.
The assumed com and soybean yields (Table 3) contribute to the negative net
returns in the baseline systems. Although the yields may be considered low by some
people, they do represent 5-year averages for the study region, based on SDASS data.
While our analyses were based on 124-bushel com, yields at the Southeast Experiment
Farm have ranged from 120 to 180 bushels an acre, depending on the year.
Crop market prices used in the budgets also influence the net return results. As
previously stated, the prices used were 5-year averages. In the case of com, the $1.75 per
bushel price that was used is at least $.14 higher than the average price in three of the
years used to compute the 5-year average. The soybean price of $4.77 per bushel that
was used is higher than the average price in 4 of the years used to compute the 5-year
average. The reader should keep in mind, however, that the CCPs and LDPs included in
the profitability analyses for our representative farm have inverse relationships to com
and soybean market prices.
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The land charge used in the budgets is critical to the net return calculations. The
not-quite-break-even net returns for the baseline com/soybean systems suggest that the
$90 per acre cash rent fully captured Government payments.
Analysis of diverse crop rotations

The alternative and organic rotations shown in Table 2 represent forms of longer
rotations that "representative" farmers might be enticed to adopt through CSP contracts.
The rotations vary in length and crop mix. All rotations receive the same DPs and CCPs,
based on previously stated farm program assumptions. LDPs differ among the rotations,
however.
Alternative non-organic rotations. The first alternative rotation developed was a
com-soybean-spring wheat rotation, rotation A.

Rotation A models a rotation being

studied at SDSU's Southeast Experiment Farm. Although the rotation is only a slight
variation from the baseline, the addition of spring wheat has some economic implications.
The rotation has a net income without Government payments of -$43.66 per acre,
similar to baseline rotations 1 and 2. Spring wheat is the only crop that does not qualify
for an LDP based on the price assumptions used in the enterprise budgets. This leads to
LDPs of only $2.81 per acre for the rotation, which is less than the $4.21 average per acre
LDP in the baseline rotations. Net income with Government farm program (but not CSP)
payments came to -$6.33 per acre for rotation A (Table 6).
Rotation B-with winter wheat, rather than the spring wheat that is in rotation
A-shows a greater net loss (excluding CSP payments) than rotation A and baselines 1
and 2. The net income without Government payments for rotation B is -$48.36 per acre
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and the net income with program payments is -$7.04 (Table 6). Winter wheat has a $.26
per bushel, or $11.96 per acre, LDP. Consequently, rotation B has the highest average
LDPs per acre of all the rotations. Nevertheless, the baseline rotations perform slightly
better than rotation B in terms of net income with program payments.
Rotation C is the first rotation analyzed that contains alfalfa. Previous research
has shown that alfalfa can significantly enhance the profitability of a farming operation,
but the relative contribution of alfalfa to overall profitability of any system is affected by
the price received for alfalfa relative to the prices received for other crops (Henning and
Dobbs). The alfalfa price used for all the rotations was the 5-year average, $66 per ton
(Table 3).
Rotation C

is an alfalfa-alfalfa-alfalfa-alfalfa-com-soybeans-com-soybeans

rotation. This rotation incorporates a forage legume but also has a strong row crop
presence. The alfalfa in this rotation is straight seeded in the first year, with one cutting
taken in the establishment year. It was assumed that in the following years there would
be three cuttings per year, with yields changing as the alfalfa stand ages.
Rotation C has a net income without Government payments of -$4.29 per acre.
Although this value is negative, it is substantially higher than any of the other rotation net
returns discussed thus far. Rotation C is the first rotation analyzed that has a positive net
income with program payments included. Including program payments, rotation C has an
average per acre net return of $32.34. This value is $35.24 higher than the baseline 1
value (Table 6).
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The economic contribution of alfalfa to rotation C is substantial. Rotation C's net
income without Government payments is very similar to the previously mentioned
rotations' net income with program payments. Not only does alfalfa contribute directly to
net returns, but also com following alfalfa in the budgets has lower input costs because of
legume credits from alfalfa (Gerwing and Gelderman).
Rotation C shows considerable economic incentive for producers to change to a
longer rotation from the baseline rotation, but factors also exist that discourage producers
from a longer rotation such as this. A study by Henning and Dobbs on the contribution of
alfalfa to whole-farm profitability concluded that, although alfalfa may add profitability
to a farm system, there appears to be more price risk associated with alfalfa than with

grain and oilseed crops. The high establishment cost and price risk associated with
alfalfa may be some of the reasons it is no longer included in many crop rotations.
Rotation D was the first rotation in which we considered both GMO and nonGMO seed varieties.

The rotation consists of oats/alfalfa-alfalfa-alfalfa-alfalfa-com-

soybeans-com-soybeans.

The oats constitute a nurse crop for alfalfa.

In the

establishment year for alfalfa, the oats are harvested for grain and one cutting of alfalfa
also is assumed to be harvested. Results show this rotation, with conventional seed, to be
the third highest performing non-organic alternative rotation in the analysis.

The

conventional seed rotation has a net income with program payments of $42.34 per acre.
The GMO version is just slightly lower, at $39.53 per acre (Table 6). The difference in
net returns can be attributed mostly to seed costs. The estimated GMO seed cost for Bt
com was $42 per acre at the time of our study, while the estimated conventional seed cost
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was $28 per acre, a difference of $14. The estimated cost for RR soybeans in 30-inch
rows was $29.04 per acre, while the estimated conventional seed cost was $19.04 per
acre, a difference of $10.
In this analysis, a farmer using GMO seed varieties appears to be at a slight
economic disadvantage compared to one using conventional seed. However, research
suggests that improved pest control is the major factor in farmers' adoption of GMO seed
varieties (Van Scharrel and Van der Sluis). Improved yields and reduction of labor and
herbicide costs also have been cited as key reasons farmers choose to grow Bt com and
RR soybeans; Lacking a firm basis for assigning different yields to the GMO and nonGMO crops, we assumed the same yields. To the extent GMO crops may actually
average higher yields, the net return comparisons would differ from those reported here.
Our main focus in this study was not a GMO/non-GMO comparison, however, so readers
should exercise caution in drawing conclusions about whether or not to use GMO seed
from our alternative versions of rotations D, E, and F.
Rotation E involves 3 years of alfalfa and 1 year each of com, soybeans, and

t
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winter wheat. This rotation is the only rotation that uses a forage legume, row crops, and
small grain as major crops. Other rotations contain all three, but the small grain is used
as a nurse crop. The alfalfa is straight seeded in rotation E, and the winter wheat is not
used as a nurse crop.
Rotation E is not as profitable as other alternative rotations with alfalfa (Table 6).
This can be attributed to the low price of winter wheat. Rotation E, however, does have
significantly better net income figures than the baseline rotations. The conventional seed
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variation of rotation E-as also noted for rotation D-is more profitable than the GMO
variation.
Both GMO and conventional seed versions of Rotation F also are shown in Table
6. This is the most profitable non-organic alternative rotation. The conventional seed
version results in $11.28 per acre of net income without Government payments, while the
GMO figure is $9.40 per acre.

The net income with program payments value for

conventional seed is $47.20 per acre, and the GMO value is $45.33 per acre. These net
income with program payments values are approximately $50 higher than the
corresponding baseline rotation (com/soybean system) values.
Spring wheat in rotation F is used as a nurse crop for establishing the alfalfa. In
this rotation, the spring wheat is harvested as grain, and there is no alfalfa cutting in the
first year.

Oats are generally planted as a nurse crop for alfalfa, but spring wheat

sometimes is used.

A comparison between the straight seeded alfalfa, spring

wheat/alfalfa, and oats/alfalfa enterprise budgets shows that establishing alfalfa with oats
has the highest net return in the establishment year, given cost and yield assumptions we
used.
Rotation G has respectable net income figures and a considerable economic
advantage over the baseline rotation systems (Table 6). This oats/alfalfa-alfalfa-alfalfacom-soybeans-com rotation has an extra year of com relative to soybeans. One reason we
included this rotation is that interviews indicated that recent changes in farm program
commodity payments might lead some farmers to expand the share of com in their crop
mix.
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In summary, most of the alternative rotations analyzed here out-perform the
baseline rotations (Table 6).

Only rotations that include alfalfa show positive net

incomes with Government program payments included.
Organic rotations. Organic rotation systems are assumed by many people to
generally represent relatively high levels of ecological stewardship. Certified organic
rotations require the utmost attention to detail when selecting a crop rotation. Without
the help of synthetic chemicals, an organic farmer must use careful management of crop
rotations and tillage practices to ensure that insect, weed, and disease cycles are
controlled. The CSP may provide economic incentives for some farmers to consider
organic agriculture. We expected organic rotations to have potential to qualify for Tier 3
CSP contracts.
The organic rotation results are shown two ways in Table 6. Both organic
rotations were analyzed with the conventional crop prices used in the alternative and
baseline budgets.

However, those same organic rotations also were analyzed using

premium organic prices.

Certified organic crops qualify for premium prices in the

market, presented previously in Table 3.
Organic rotation A is a com-soybean-oats/alfalfa-alfalfa rotation modeled after
rotations in recent organic farming studies by Delate et al. and Porter et al., cited in
Section III. Organic rotation A without the organic price premiums has a net income
with program payments of $12.78 per acre. This value is considerably higher than those
for the baseline rotations; however, the organic per acre return is less than the alternative
rotations that include alfalfa. Analysis of organic rotation A assuming organic price
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premiums leads to a quite different result, however. With premiums, this organic rotation
out-performs the baseline and alternative rations by a considerable margin. With organic
price premiums, organic rotation A's net income without Government payments is
$62.02 per acre, much higher than that of the best performing non-organic rotation.
Adding in Government program payments for organic rotation A results in a net income
of $99.25 per acre (Table 6).
Organic rotation B shows results similar to those of organic rotation A, when
compared to the baseline and alternative rotations. Assuming conventional crop prices in
organic rotation B, the net income without Government payments is -$3 .20 per acre;
assuming organic price premiums, it is $65.97, $69.17 higher. Like rotation A, when
assuming price premiums, the organic net income without Government program
payments is higher than the baseline and alternative non-organic rotation net incomes
with program payments.

As shown previously in Table 3, the yields used in the organic budgets are lower

than those in the non-organic budgets, except in the case of oats. The lower yields also
translate into smaller LDPs for the organic crop rotations. Helping to offset those lower
yields are lower input costs, because the organic budgets do not include any synthetic
chemicals. Without synthetic chemical pesticides, weeds and pests must be controlled
through mechanized practices and rotations. In the case of organic soybeans, hand labor
was assumed to be employed, along with mechanized tillage practices. The extra
mechanization and hand labor practices result in higher fuel, machinery, and labor costs
for the organic rotations.
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Organic budgets entail other additional costs. In the case of organic soybeans and
oats, a cleaning charge was imposed, based on data obtained from Brummond and
Swenson. A cleaning charge of $.45 per bushel was assessed in enterprise budgets based
on organic price premiums. The charge was assessed only in the budgets with price
premiums because a producer would likely omit the cleaning process if he or she were
planning to sell organic grains or soybeans at conventional prices.
The organic rotations included oats and alfalfa (oats/alfalfa) where oats are
planted as a nurse crop. The oats are harvested as grain, but, unlike the non-organic
budgets, the assumption for the organic rotations-based on interviews with organic
farmers-is that there is no alfalfa cutting in the establishment year.
The two different price scenarios for the organic rotations were used to show the
relatively higher returns a farmer could realize when he or she is able to capture organic
price premiums. However, an organic farmer might not receive organic prices for the
entire harvest. The crop might not qualify for the premium because of poor quality.
Also, farmers sometimes may have trouble gaining access to organic markets. Consumer
demand for organic products has increased over time, but organic crop acreage accounts
for a very small fraction of total crop acreage, resulting in a limited number of market
outlets. Results shown in Table 6 for the organic rotations under the two different price

scenarios-without and with organic premiums-should be viewed as ranges of potential
net returns per acre.
In summary, organic rotations have the highest potential per acre return when
price premiums are included. Except for rotations A and B, all of the alternative and
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orgarnc (both with and without pnce premiums) rotations examined have higher
estimated per acre net incomes with program payments than do the baseline rotation
systems (Table 6). These analyses, and other research, show that organic rotations can
compete in many situations with conventional rotations.
The contributions of government payments to net returns for each rotation system
are illustrated graphically in Figure 3. The third bar in each comparison-representing
net income with all government payments-includes the assumed CSP payments. Results
of the analysis with those payments included are presented next.
Inclusion of CSP payments

The following analysis is focused on potential CSP payments and implications for
the profitability of different rotation systems on the "representative" farm. Results are
organized according to the CSP contract tiers described in Sections I and IV.
Rotation systems were placed in different tier levels based on potential environmental
gains associated with each one. The base payment is different for each tier level. Tier 1
contracts receive the lowest base payment, while Tier 3 contracts receive the highest base
payment. Cost share payments also vary, since each rotation has different costs that
might be eligible for payments. Assumed CSP base and cost share payments for each
rotation are shown in Table 6.
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Figure 3. Returns per Acre with
Baseline Price and Yield Assumptions:
Progression of Govt Payments
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The alternative organic and non-organic rotations represent potential conservation
crop rotations that provide environmental benefits. Consequently, they were assumed to
be eligible for CSP contracts. On the other hand, we assumed that the baseline rotations
do not qualify as conservation crop rotations, because of the very limited crop mix and
the lack of a small grain or forage or green manure legwne. Therefore, the baseline
rotations were not considered eligible for any level of CSP participation, simply by virtue
of including two crops in the rotation. There may very well be conservation practices that
a corn/soybean farmer could agree to carry out to qualify for some type of CSP contract,
but non-rotation practices were not the focus of our analyses.
Tier 1 contract. A CSP Tier 1 contract requires a producer to enroll only a portion
of his or her farm in the program. A Tier 1 contract in this analysis receives a base
payment of $4.20 per acre. Alternative rotations A and B were assumed to qualify for
Tier 1 contracts, and we assumed that all 1,000 acres on the representative farm were
enrolled.
Rotations A and B were the shortest alternative rotations developed for this
analysis. According to our assumptions, adoption of rotation A or B represents the
minimum change a farmer might make that involves a change in rotation. Although these
rotations differ from the baseline, the assumption was that the environmental gains
associated with rotations A and B are not substantial enough to qualify for a Tier 2
contract. Rotations A and B were assumed to qualify for a Tier 1 contract based on the
environmental gains a farm operation may accrue as a result of winter or spring wheat
being planted in rotation with com and soybeans. Language for a Tier 1 contract was

43

vague at the time of our study, but we assumed that a fanner could receive a CSP
payment for implementing either rotation A or rotation B. The land rotated to wheat
could be subject to less wind or water-induced soil erosion. We assumed that there would
be no CSP cost share payments for these two rotations, because there are no significant
'establishment' costs associated with adding wheat to the com/soybean rotation.
Even with the CSP payments, returns to rotations A and B fail to cover all costs
(Table 6 and Figure3). The CSP base payment is $4.20 per acre, and the net incomes
with all Government payments-which include the CSP payments-for rotations A and
B are -$2.13 per acre and -$2.84 per acre, respectively. These net incomes are similar to
that of baseline 1 (with no CSP payment).
Tier 2 contract. Alternative rotations C through G were assumed to qualify for
Tier 2 contracts. Each rotation contains alfalfa and is at least 6 years long. These
rotations have substantial crop mixes that include a forage legume and a small grain in
addition to row crops. We assumed that these rotations would meet the requirements of a
conservation crop rotation as defined by NRCS or a resource-conserving crop rotation as
defined in the CSP legislation.
Each Tier 2 contract requires the fanner to address at least one resource of
concern for the entire agricultural operation. The resource concern in this analysis was
not explicitly defined, but a resource-conserving crop rotation can address many resource
concerns. Rotations C through G are long rotations that involve significant changes in
crop mix, compared to the baseline rotations, and we assumed whole fann involvement
for our representative farm.
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A Tier 2 contract in this scenario receives a base payment of $8.40 per acre. We
also assumed that rotations C through G would be eligible for cost share payments for the
establishment cost of alfalfa. The cost share payments differ among rotations, because
alfalfa is established using different methods over a different number of years; cost share
payments range from $5.85 to $7.91 per acre. The total CSP payments for rotations C
through Grange from $14.25 to $16.31 per acre (Table 6).
These rotations already were more profitable than the baseline rotations before
addition of the CSP payments. With the addition of CSP payments, an even stronger case
can be made for the rotations to be considered by farmers. The CSP payments for Tier 2
contracts are not large on a per acre basis, but the payments do add to the appeal of the
alternative rotations. For example, a $15 per acre CSP payment on a 1,000-acre farm
comes to $15,000. Rotations C through G with Tier 2 CSP contracts included show net
incomes with all Government payments that are at least $45 per acre greater than net
incomes for the baseline rotations (Figure 3).
Tier 3 contract. The Tier 3 contract represents the highest level of participation.
In this tier, the farmer and NRCS personnel design a resource management system

addressing all resources of concern for the entire agricultural operation. We assumed that
the organic rotations would qualify for Tier 3 contracts.

Operating a certified organic

farm generally requires the farmer to implement a production plan that incorporates at
least some resource-conserving practices throughout the farm. It is quite possible that
some organic farms would need to add some practices to those they are already carrying
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out in order to qualify for a Tier 3 contract. However, those additional practices might
well be eligible for additional CSP cost share that we have not included in our analysis.
Tier 3 contracts receive the highest base payments. The representative farm with
a CSP contract for an organic rotation in our analysis was assumed to receive a base
payment of $12.60 per acre (Table 6). There also could be cost share payments for the
establishment of alfalfa-$8.54 and $6.83 per acre for organic rotations A and B,
respectively. These cost share payments, of course, represent annual averages for the
whole (1,000-acre) farm. If stated in terms of only the acres rotated into new
(establishment) alfalfa each year, the per acre cost share payments would be much higher.
The total CSP payments received for a Tier 3 contract are $21.14 and $19.43 per
acre for organic rotations A and B, respectively. The organic rotations appear to be
competitive with a number of the non-organic rotations even without CSP contract
payments, and the addition of CSP payments adds to their relative profitability.
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VI. Summary
We have already observed in Figure 3 how the addition of CSP payments adds to
net returns of the various rotation systems in southeastern South Dakota. Net return
effects of potential CSP payments are shown another way for selected rotations in Figure
4. There, the only government payments that are included-in the second bar for each
rotation-are CSP payments. Again, we see that the diverse rotations that include alfalfa
(both organic and non-organic) are more profitable (or less unprofitable) than baseline
rotation 1 (com/soybeans) and rotation A (com/soybeans/spring wheat), even without
inclusion of CSP payments. The assumed CSP payments increase their profitability
advantage, however.
One possible conclusion might be that CSP payments are not needed to induce
more diverse crop rotation systems such as those included in our analyses. However,
previous studies have shown that even though alternative rotations appear to be
competitive with typical com/soybean rotations, farmers tend to prefer the simple
com/soybean rotation. Therefore, some added incentive, such as that provided by CSP
contracts, may be necessary if policy makers desire to restore more ecologically diverse
crop rotation systems in areas where com and soybeans are predominant. Even the CSP
payment levels we assumed in our analyses would likely be inadequate to cause largescale crop rotation shifts, so long as other farm program income and price support
payments remain high and are somewhat coupled to 'commodities'.
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Figure 4. Effects on Returns of Including Only CSP Payments:
Baseline Price Assumptions
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